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IN TH!E MA'ITER OF THE ES'VATE OF 
THoMAS FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, De-
ceesed 
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MORGAN_ AND PAYNE, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont 
128 East Center Street, 
Provo, Utah. 
-
c. .... on.w.a. 
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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ES'I1ATE OF 
THOMAS FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, De-
ceased 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY and 
VILATE P. DEVINE, 
.AJppellants, 
vs. 
MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT, 
and ELLA P. MEYER, 
Respondents. 
Brief of 
CASE 
NO. 9022 
Respondent, Marguerite Gessford p·ierpont 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In lieu of unnecessarily repeating, the Statement orf 
Case contained in Appellant's Brief at Pages 1 to 5 is in-
corporated herein and hereby refeiTed to in particularity. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Also, to prevent repetition, fue Statement o[ Facts con.-
tained in Appellant's Brief at Pages 5 to 9 is incorporated 
herein and referred to as being essentially correct togertJher 
with the following ·~hanges and additions. 
That the testator, Thomas Fairclough Pierpont, had 
been ill, requiring major operations making him so he could 
not speak and an invalid for a considocaJble time before he 
made his Will on February 15, 1954, _and finally died on 
September 14, 1954 (R. 98). That during this time, the 
testator was :left to the sole care of his widow, Marguerite 
Gessf1ord Pierpont,, who· constantly nursed and attended 
him day and night and she, continuing~ as the private sec-
retary (for many years past) of testator, assisted him with 
his many and troub~ed business affairs (R. 369 to 371). 
That testator intended to leave his widow financially inde-
pendent, as is clearly manifested by the Will itself, in ap-
preciation for her kind and faithful services and because 
his said widow is not related to any of the other legatees 
or heks of testa tor. 
On October 7, 1954, the widow elected nQt to take the 
monetary bequest of $20,000.00 provided by Paragraph 
Eighth of the Will in lieu of the bequests and benefits of 
Paragraphs Second and Seventh of said Will (R. 203, 214, 
236-237, 333). The testator's Will was duly admitted to 
prolbate October 22, 1954 (R. 23-29). 
The Executor petitioned' for a family allOIWance (R. 73) 
of, $250.00 per ·month .to reasonably maintain said widow 
,-' 
and her home in a proper manner aml this petition was ap-
proved without any. obj~tions December 17, 1954, even 
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3 
though apparently there were no "liquid' assets available 
for suoh payment." (R. 95-96) 
On December 23, 1954, the widow renounced her statu-
tory share of her husband's estate and elected to take nn-
der the Will (R. 92). 
The gross estate of decedent testate approximates one-
third miHion dollars valuation, and the net estate after pay-
ment of all debts, taxes and eoopenses of administration 
and all ·specific bequests and legacies other than to respond-
ents herein was $158,339.22. 'Dhere has been no showing 
at any time of any inrubility herein by the Executor-Trus-
tee, Tracy-Collins Trust Company, to pay the annuities and 
payments specified by the WilL On the contrary, the said 
residue now consists of liquid assets and the Executor-Trus-
tee has been aJble to collect accounts due and to borrow. 
large sums of money ($70,000.00) at four to five percent 
interest unsecured on the asssets of said estate and has 
never been in danger of having to sell or liquidate at a sac-
rifice any of the property of testator (R. 208-213, 297-305, 
336). 
That the Executor-Trustee has without right withheld 
payments of the annuities to the widow, Marguerite Gess-
ford Pierpont, ·and to the sister of testator, Ella P. Meyer, 
and has caused the accrual 01f interest thereon without faul:t 
of the annuitants even though the Court first interpreted 
the Will as to the payment of sa1d annuities as early as 
October 25, 1957, in favor of respondents herein (R. 319). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
niAT IF THE COURT FINDS THE WILL AMBIGU-
OUS OR UNCERTAIN IN ITS TERMS OR MEANING, 
~ENCE SHOULD BE ADDUCED TO SHOW THE 
INTENTION OF TESTATOR. 
POINT II 
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAY· 
MENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) 
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF DEATH 
OF TESTAroR. 
POINT III 
THE WILL SHOWS THAT THE TESTATOR DID 
NOT INTEND TO POSTPONE THE PAYMENTS PRO-
VIDED UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UN-
TIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRffiUTED TO THlE TRUS-
TEE. 
POINT IV 
THE PAYMENTS UND·ER SUBPARAGRAPH SEV-
ENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE ANNUITIES AND ARE 
CONTROLLED BY SECTION 74-3-14, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE 
AMOUNTS DECREED TO BE DUE THEM. 
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ARGUMENT 
The whole problem in this case is typified by the mean-
ing of the words "during her lifetime" in paragraph 7 (i) 
referring to respondents, Marguerite Gessford Pierpont and 
Ella P. Meyer. According to aJppellants, these words "dur-
ing her lifetime" do not speak as of date of death of tes-
tator but rather are indicative to the trustee only to pay 
such payments after the estate assets are physically de-
livered to the trustee. Not only this artifice is maintained, 
but the trustee also claims that the testator only "desired" 
certJain ;payments be made to his widow and sister during 
their lifetimes and that therefore the trustee is not required 
to make such payments if it should be against the discretion 
of trustee to make such payments or to make up such pay-
ments if suspended. It should be remembered that the 
Executor and Trustee herein are identical and that . the 
claim of ina!bility to ·pay payments from the trust assets 
until received by the trustee is a sham. The trustee is 
maintaining in behalf of certain of the residuary legatees 
against the specific annuitants receiving about three years 
of monthly payments in the face of the obvious wording 
and intent of the testator even though the,re are ample 
funds available. If the trustee is correct, then the annui-
tants (respondents) could have been deprived of their pay-
ments for 5, 10, or more years merely by the device of fail-
ing to settle the estate and refusing indefinitely to transfer 
on their books the assets from the Executor to the Trus-
tee and insisting that the trust and Trustee were not yet 
in existence. Certainly the widow, who had the elections 
to not take under the Will or to take $20,000.00 cash in 
lieu of other benefits, would not have been so anxious to 
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6 
make her election to take under the Will and . the ·trust 
if she had known the contrary intent and arbitrary pow-
ers of "discretion" claimed by the Trustee herein in not 
making the payments or in not making up suspended pay-
ments even when adequate funds are available and especially 
when there is no showing by the Trustee of inability to get 
funds to make such payments under paragraph 7 (i) -of the 
Will and without "sacrificing" the estate as warned by the 
testator in paragraph 7 (k). 
The Will of testator manifestly provides first and fore-
most for the security and well-being of the widOtW. To 
favor residuary legatees now as against the clear intent of 
testator to give the widow $250.00 per month during her 
lifetime is unconsciona!ble, especially where the· estate is 
ample and should earn sufficient income on approximately 
$150,000.00 principal to more than pay the annuities pro-
vided f()[' the widow ~and sister of testator. The decedent 
knew the extent of his holdings and property and the ex-
tent or.f the charges to be made under his Will. He also 
knew that his sister was aged and in poor health (R. 363) 
and would not probably live much longer than the testa-
tO[' himself. The widow W1ould be cut off from her annui-
ty if she should re.Jmarry and therefore receive her sup-
port elsewhere or if she should take the $20,000.00 cash 
under Baragmph Eighth. It is significant that paragraph 
7 (i) instructs that the Trustee shall make disbursements 
"From the income of the Trust Estate and, if insufficient, 
from the principal thereof," indicating the full extent to 
which the testator was willing to go to see that these month-
ly payments would be made. To adequately provide for 
the .widoiW and sister for their dependent lifetimes was rea-
sonably uppel'lmost in his n1ind. 
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:famgraph 7 (k) is interesting for analysis. It pro-
vides that if income is insufficient and principal funds are 
not available that the Trustee "may" reduce and if neces-
sary "may suspend" further payments until funds become 
available through income or through orderly sale. of all or 
part of the principal assets, but in the event any payments 
specified to be made by Trustee shall be so reduced or sus-
pended, when funds become availaJble, any so resulting 
deficiencies shall be made up. Also, the subparagraph pro- · 
vides that the Trustee shall not sacrifiice the assets for sale 
"to meet the payments specified in this Will" but the Trus-
tee is informed that principal assets should be Hquified to 
ena!ble the Trustee "to make the payments specified here-
under." (Boldface ours.) Now any reasonable ·man would 
know that monthly payments cannot be made if "income is 
insufficient'' and ''principal funds are not available.'' But 
how Trustee interprets this section to mean that just 'be-
cause the assets should not be sacrificed by Trustee gives 
him the discretion not to make up the payments is. inoom:. 
prehensible when more than adequate funds have become 
available for making up such deficiencies. Can it be said 
from the word·ing of this subpwagraph that the testator 
intended that any so resulting deficiencies should not be 
made up when funds beoame available? Certainly not. 
The only purpose of the paragmph is to prevent a .sacri-
ficing of assets. There is no language of aJbsolute direc-
tion in subparagraph 7 (k) eXJcept to possi:bly avoid sac-
Iificing of assets. Nobody would want his estate sacri-
ficed anyway, but this surely does not make the other state-
ments of the subparagraph discretionary with the Trustee 
c:.tmtrary to the voiced intention and desire of testator to 
make up deficiencies when funds become available! In re 
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Pittocks Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633, cited by appel-
lants, was a case of directly contrasting language ill a di.:. 
rection fu!llowed by a desire (the desire being ruled not man-
datory) where in Pierpont's Will subparagraph _7- ·(k) _we 
have permissions to reduce or suspend payments in emer-
gencies and a desire to make up def.iciencies1 followed by 
a direction not to sacrifice the estate. It is not the same! 
Besides, in the Oregon case, the two instructions, one di-
rectory and the other requesting, were in conflict and det-
rimental to interests ·of the trustees -·as directors of the 
Oregonian Publishing Company and ·would thus become 
oontrary to intention of testator. There is no conflict in 
7 (k) of Pierpont's Will neither is there any detriment suf-
fered when the clear intention of testator is to make speci-
fied monthly payments to respondents and to make up any 
emergency deficiencies when funds become availaf>Ie~ 
Some point has been made that the widow is getting 
her family allO!Wance in addition to the claimed annuity 
during her lifetime. It should be pointed out that a fam-
ily allowance to a widow during administration is an ab-
solute right-even where a portion of the estate has been 
set aside as her share o[ the estate. See In re Pugsley, 
27 Utah 489, 76 Pac. 560. See 74-3-3, U. C. A. 1953, which 
treats a family allowance as a debt of administration and 
a charge on the property of estate on a priority basis. Also 
see 75-8-1, U. C. A. 1953, stating that a surviving wife is 
entitled to such allowance out of the estate as may be neces-
sary or reasonaJble fur support whioh may date from death 
of decedent and is a preference to all other debts except 
the last illness, funeral exJPense and expense of adminis-
tration. The Pierpont WHl sets out the amount of the fam-
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ily allowance that is reasonable but it is a debt of admin-
istration and not a legacy or bequest as is the monthly an-
nuity "during her lifetime." See also 74-2-6, U. C. A. 1953, 
which states that a clear bequest cannot be changed by 
inference or argument from another part of the will. 
It should also be noticed tlha.t Paragraph Eig1hth of 
said Will provides after the trust parngmph Seventh that 
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont has the election to take a 
cash bequest of $20,000.00 in lieu of any benefits under 
paragraphs Second and Seventh and thus recognizes the 
right of the widow to the family allowance of $250.00 per 
month during administration provided in Paragraph Sixth. 
Thus, the widow would have collected $20,000.00 cash and 
her family allowance of $250.00 per month for three years 
of administration in lieu of furniture, car and lifetime an-
nuity. (She already. got the home on Shakespeare Avenue 
by survivorship of a jbmt tenancy with deceased (R. 172). 
The widow would have been entitled to her family allow-
ance if she had elected not to take under the Will at all, 
but she elected to take under the Will after her family al-
lowance was ordered and she had to make her election in 
this instance and under the Will provisions before distri-
bution to the Trustee of the residue. Where is there any-
thing in the Will to indicate that testator intended the wi-
dow not to have her annuity in addition to the family al-
lowance? The widow is entitled to family allowance by 
statute regardless of provisions of the Will, and she would 
have been entitled to a widow's allowance even if the Will 
had provided for none. 
The sister, Ella P. Meyer, under paragraph 7 (i) is 
to receive $100.00 per month during her UfeHme the same 
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as the widow is to receive from income and principal, if 
necessary, during her lifetime. $250.00 per month. The 
wording _is . the same for botJh and should mean ·the same 
for both. Where wording occurs more than once in a Will 
it is presumed to have been used in the same sense and this 
rule applies wi1Jh double force where the wording is fOund 
in two ~sentences in immediate succession. In re MUrphy's 
Estate, 99 Montana 114, 43 Pac. 2nd. 233. The widow and 
sister should be treated alike in· both receiving their an-
nuities from testator's death date as it 'is obvious the tes-
tator intended the sister to have the monthly income fur 
the short time she might survive him and she is not pr<>-
vided any family allowance. It is interesting also to note 
that testator provided that the monthly payment would 
cease upon re-marriage of the widow. How could such 
payments cease upon re-marriage during administration 
if it were not intended that such- .payments should com-
mence before distribution to the Trustee, namely, upon tes-
tator's date of death? 
Also it is Interesting to note precatory language (and 
the rule in re· Pittock's Will cited above by appellants) of-
subparagraphs 7 (i) and 7 (j) where 7 (i) and 7 (j) ·are-
similax in stating ''from income or principal" my Trustee, 
"subject to the- provisions of subparagraph (k) of this 
Paragraph Seventh," and are dissimilar in 7 (i) stating 
"shall" made disbursements (of annuities) and 7 (j) say-
ing "may" make disbursements for emergency needs of 
certain hedrs. Applying the rule of Pittock's Will, para-
graph 7 (i) is mandatory and 7 (j) is permissive or advis-
ory. 
Even ·allowing the interpretation of the wording of 
the Will as presented by appellants, the application of the 
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11' 
legal principles cited in the cases will not allOw· ·any practi-
cal outcome of this case different from the ruling Of the 
lower court, as will be shown in the law cited in the fol-
lowing Podnts. 
POINT 1 
THAT IF THE OOURT FINDS THE WILL AMBIGU-
OUS OR UNCERTAIN IN·ITS TERMS-OR MEANING, 
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADDUCED TO SHOW THE 
INTENTION OF TESTATOR. 
The Flndings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Judgment and Decree interpreting. said ··Will herein (R. 
460-472) are based. upon the ruling in effect that evidence 
as to testamentary intent would be admissible if at all only. 
if the Will was ambiguous: and no ambiguity: was found 
(R. 462, 469). If on this appeal it is determined that therer. 
is ambiguity in the Will, the cause should be remanded for 
the taking of evidence as to testamentary intent as offered· 
by respondents (R. 369-371) and -Transcdpt of Proceedings 
on June 30, 1958. 
The respondent, Marguerite- Gessford Pierpont; -feels 
1Jh:at the Will is dear and unambiguous and that -the inten-
tion· of testator was to pFovide ·a monthly annUity from the · 
date of testator's death. Mitchell v. Reeves, 196 A. 785 
(Conn), 115 ALR 1114, holds: What a testator meant by 
what he said, and not what he meant to say, is the ques.; 
tion involved in interpreting a will. To the same effect 
of construing a will according to legal effect of words used 
is the case of In re Beal's Estate, 117 Utah 189, 214 Pac. · 
2nd 525. 
When resort is had to written instrument alone, the· 
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interpretation of the trial court, if reasolla!ble, will be ac-
cepted by the appellate Court, or if that interpretation is 
one of two reasonable views, it will be follOIWed. In re 
Platt's EstaJt:e, 21 Cal. 2nd. 343, 131 Pac. 2nd 825; In re 
Northcutt's Estate, 16 Oal. 2nd 683, 107 Pac. 2nd 607. 
POINT IT 
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAY-
MENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) 
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF DEATH 
OF TESTATOR. 
The judgment appealed from awarded the $250.00 
monthly installments of annuity to the widow, Marguerite 
Gessford Pierpont, together with interest thereon until paid 
for the period from September 14, 1954, w'hen testator died, 
to October 18, 1957, when the residue of the estate was 
distributed to the Trustee (R. 471) and said judgment awar-
ded the sister, Ella P. Meyer, a similar judgment for her 
said $100.00 monthly payments for said period of adminds-
tration. 
There is nothing difficult about this problem of when 
the trust vests, especially when the Will. contains the pe-
riod denoted for the payments to be paid "during her life-
time." Sec. 74-2-25, U. C. A. 1953, says: "Testamentary 
dispositions, including devises and bequests to a person on 
attaining majority, are presumed to vest at the testator's 
death." The statute answers the question. A Utah case 
on this statute also destroys in Utah the fiction of the sep-
aration between Executor and Trustee as to their powers 
and duties-In re LoWe's Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 Pac. 
128. This case holds that a beneficiary with power to 
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change trustee under Will is entitled to make such change 
before distribution o[ the property to the Trustee from the 
Executors. The appellant Trustee contended since it did 
not have possession from distribution of the tTUSt property, 
the testator could not have intended for the beneficiary to 
have the power to substitute Trustee and require transfer 
of trust property to new Trustee until distribution orf the 
property from suoh Executors to the testamentary Trustee. 
c The court also held in the Lowe case that sinoe under 
the statute (7 4-2-25 U.C.A. 1953) all testamentary dispo-
sitions are presumed to vest at the testator's death and 
there was nothing in the Will to indicate an intention on the· 
part of testatrix that the vesting orf the bequests and de-
vises made therein should be postponed beyond her death, 
that the Trustee should divest itself orf the title to the trust 
property which testatrix knew would vest in her Trustee 
at the moment of her death. And trns was true even thou~h 
no distribution had been made from Executor to Trustee 
and the wording of Will was that the testamenrtary Trustee 
should transfer and convey all of such property at the time 
in its Winds and possession to such other trust company as 
her said ~daughter might designate in writing. 
Title -under a testamentary ;trust vests as of the date· 
of deaJth ·of testa tor and Trustee's title and thaJt of the 
beneficiary vest as of that date, and a life tenant is there-
fore entitled to income from drute of dearth of testator as 
an incident of that title. In re Hyland's Estate, 58 Cal. Aprp. 
2nd 556, 137 Pac. 2nd 73, 75. 
Where will created trust which gave income to ben~ 
ficiaries for life, beneficiaries were entitled to income from 
the date of testator's death, notwithstanding fact that 
trustees of such trust had not received the corpus from the 
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executor till some time thereafter. In re Schiffman's Es-
tate, 86 Cal. App. 2nd 638, 195 Pac. 2nd 484, 488. 
In the absence of a provision in the will otherwise, 
the legatee of a monthly annmrty was entitled to payments 
from the date of death of the testator together wirth in-
terest on all unpaid amounts from the date accrued. In re 
Luckel's Estate, 151 Cal. App. 2nd 481, 312 Pac. 2nd 24, 31. 
See also Sectioo. 234, comments a, b, e, f, and g, Reo-
statement of Trusts, 2nd, where beneficiary is entitled to 
income from date of death of testator and this rule is ap-
plicable to trusts creaJted by residuary bequest and it is 
Immaterial whether the same person is designated as ex-
ecutor and trustee. 
In Pierpont's Will, not only is income given to the life 
annuitants for disbursement thereof, but if income is in-
sufficient to complete the payments, the corpus or prin-
cipal shall be used when funds become available without 
sacrificing said estate assets. A fortiori the payments 
provided in Pierpont's Will are paya;ble from date of dearth 
of testator. This is the only consistent view!point with the 
use by testator of the phrases "during her lifetime." 
In re Platt'·s Estate, cited supra, deals with . nearly all 
of the problems concerned in this Pierpont Will and appeal 
and this case follows the rule of the Restatement, Section 
234, Trusts, also cited above. Platt holds that the trust 
vests ·at testator's death. See also Estate of Hill, 149 Cal. 
App. 2nd 779, 309 Pac. 2nd 39; and Estate of Dare, 196 
Oal. 29, 35, 235 Pac. 725, where the allocation of income 
is to be made by the trustee, not the executor, even though 
they may be the same person. And see Will of S. C. Leitsch, 
(Wise.) 201 N. W. 284, 37 A. L. R. 547, which states the 
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greart: weight of authority that a bequest of a life estate 
in a residuary fund, or some aliquot part theTeof, if no 
fune is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the 
interest or the enj~moort of the use or income of the resi-
due, the legartee for life is entitled to the interest or income 
....... from the death of testator. 
Starte Bank of Chicago vs. Gross, 344 Til. 512, 176 NE 
739, 75 ALR 172, while holding payments'are due from date 
of death of testator also holds that the executor may pay 
these amounts directly to the booeficiaries without waiting 
to transfer the residue or specifi.c fund to the trustee· and 
thart for trustee to withhold payments until distvibution of 
residue to trustee ''would be to enrich the residuary lega-
tee by income from the trust fund whieh would not prop-
erly belong to the residuum of the estate·." Also, the cre-
ation of the trust is not "fixed by the time the executors 
actually delivered the trust funds to the trustee, or, if ex-
ecutors and trustees were one, the time when they segr~ 
gated the trust funds or made appropriate entries on their 
books." 
POINT III 
THE WILL SHOWS THAT TI:IE TESTATOR DID 
NOT INTEND TO POSTPONE THE PAYMENTS PRD-
VIDED UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UN~ 
TIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO TH1E TRUS-
TEE. 
The argument against paying the annuity to the -wi-
dow because she already got a family allowance has been 
argued hereinabove. How about the sister who got noth-
ing on her annuity for over three years? The trustee's 
position is not fair and it is trying to act as sole judge a~ 
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to who is entitled to what payments under the Will and 
is selfishly withholding from the chief beneficiaries the 
residue for its own interests as Trustee and in favor of re-
maindermen all contrary to the e~licit wishes and inten-
tions of testartor. In re Ferran's Estate, (Cal.) 248 Pac. 
2nd 108, 112, holds tha!t if there is any doubt or uncertainty 
about the intention of the settlor in a trust, it will be con-
strued, if possible, in favor of the beneficiary and against 
the trustee. This was a case where trustee did not in-
vade principal of trust for beneficiary where income was 
insufficient for her needs even where she had adequate 
outside income and trustee had discretion to invade prin-
cipal or not. "The mere fact that the trustee is given dis-
cretion does not authorize him to act beyond the bounds 
of a reasonable judgment." "Whenever exercise of a trus-
tee's discretion, absolute or otherwise, is challenged, the 
basic inquiry is whether trustee acted in state of mind 
contemplated by the settlor." 
The way the appellants balloon the figures as to the 
share of the widow and sister over a period of future years 
(Appellants Brief Pg. 23 and 40) you would think they 
resent these payments because it ·may deplete the estate 
8.91% plus. Futurity means nothing for the sake of ar-
gument. The widow may re--marry or the widow a..'>ld sis-
ter may die. It is manifest, however thaJt if Trustee has 
its unchecked "discretion" the widow would have been 
farr better off to take her $20,000.00 and her widow's al-
lowance rather than the annuity. The Trustee, should not 
escape responsibility for withholding the annuity payments 
and the accruing interest owing thereon. This situation 
has been laTgely created by the Trustee and litigious heirs, 
not the respondents herein. If a large unpaid sum builds 
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up which may go to 'the heirs and representatives of annui-
tant, that is the fault of the Trustee for not paying the 
sums to the widow and sister monthly as needed for their 
maintainance and as intended by the testaJtor. 
109 A.L.R. 717 et seq. states that where a monthly 
or yeaTly installment is given to a beneficiary, it is payable 
out of principal even without a specific instruction to that 
effect. When it is allowed specifically ourt of the principal, 
it is in the nature of an annuity ·and is not a fluctuating 
income from trust property and it will take precedenc~ 
over a residuary grant and must be paid even to the ex-
haustion of the trust fund. 
A life tenant's right to annuity bequeathed to her un-
der testamentary trust was cumulative even in years dur-
ing which income from trust was insufficient to meet an-
nuity in view of the fact that it was expressly pro\Tided in 
will that any deticiency in trust inoome should rbe made up 
out of principal. Caughy vs. Starte Deposit and Trust Co., 
196 Md. 252, 76 A. 2nd 323. 
There is just nothing in the Will or in the law which 
proVides for a .postponement of these monthly payments 
to annuitants. All that is asked is 1Jhe unpaid amounts due 
during probate ,as ordered and adjudged due to respondents 
herein (R. 471). The income of the estate will 'more than 
adequately carry these payments in the future and the 
whole trust corpus and more will eventually be distributed 
to the remaindermen. 
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POINT IV 
THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEV-
ENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE ANNUITIES AND ARE 
CONTROLLEID BY SECTION 74-3-14, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953. 
This is a rewarding subject to discuss but tt is ridicu-
lous for appellants to define annuities as they do using the 
life insurance definition of annuity from Section 31-11-2, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
Our Utah Code classifies legacies in Section 74-3-1 and 
in sub ( 3) thereof defines an annuity as a bequest of cer-
tain specified sums periodically. Certainly the periodic 
sums specified lby Pierpont in his own woros to be paid 
respondents during their lifetimes fit the Utah definition 
of annuities. 
Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, provides: "Legacies are 
due and deliveraJble at the e~iration of one year after the 
testator's decease. Annuities commence at the testator's 
decease.'' 
Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 1953, refers back to 74-3-1, 
wherein all the kinds of legacies are defined and including 
a legacy of annuity. Annuities then, commence at the tes-
tator's death but all other legacies are due and deliverable 
at the expiration of one year afiter tihe testator's decease. 
This is aJbsolutely compatible and explanatory of the phrase 
employed 'by Testator "during her lifetime" with regard 
to the payments to respondents in 7 (i) of the Will. The 
position of the widow and sister then is in complete har-
mony with Utah statute law. (Even if appellants are cor-
reet that these are not annuities, the payments would then 
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be general legacies- due one year after death m decedent 
and therefore two years before distribution of residue to· 
Trustee where the Will does not state a contrary: time, for 
commencement!!.) 
In re Sears Estate, 18 Utah 19&, 55 Pac. 83;. holds that 
payments reserved ~oc a surviving wife are annuities even; 
though the· amount is. discretionary wiJth· the Trustee. ·The: 
Court made an issue of rthe fuot that it was not discretion-
ary fur Trustee to pay only a little to widow and~ as. much 
as possible to other beneficiaries as the· TestaJtor had' pro-
vided for· his wife first .a.nd foremost. (That is really the-
objection to: the Pierpont Will-tha:t the testator p:vovided' 
for his- wife first and foremost!) 
Black's Law Dictionary says an annuity is a legacy 
payable by installments. 96 C.J.S. 547, Section: 1014 oo 
Wills states that an installment oharge is an ·annuity, unless 
it consists merely orf income from· a fund. 
Section 902 on Wills, 96 C.J.S. 351-352, states that a 
gift. of an annuity constitutes a legacy or bequest and that 
it may be subject to such limitations as the testatorr may 
impose. 
Let us again remember that the testator said the· pay-
ments were· to ibe disbursed monthly during the lifetime of 
the widow and during the lifetime of the sister; He· did· 
not say commencing three years after my decease or- when 
the Executor gets around ,tJo transferring the trust assets-
to the Trustee or when ~the books are brought up to date 
and- changed from Executor to Trustee. 
On Page· 36; of AppeUants' Brief tJhis ''sound discretion 
of the Trustee" to·make up suspended payments has already' 
been argued against, but it is indicative of the extreme to 
which the Trustee resorts to have its own way and :rob 
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present annuitants to favor remaindermen for selfish pur-
poses, even when testator explicitly states they "shall be 
made up". The Respondents have had to go to the Su-
preme Court to defend rtheir rights and have not brought 
any suits against Trustee to force a sale of prineipal assets 
in payment of annuities. 'Dhis is unnecessary now because 
ample funds are availaJble to make up "such deficiencies" 
created hy an over-reaching, capricious and arbitrary Trus-
tee. It is such elementary law that personal representativ:es 
of Respondents would succeed to large unpaid sums due them 
under the Will that it will not even be discussed except to re-
peat that the Trustee caused such a situation against the 
wishes of both Testator and Respondents. The Trustee was 
amrply protected by two rulings of the lower Court on this 
lawsuit but still persists in taxing and battling the heirs 
and estate. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE 
AMOUNTS DECREED TO BE DUE THEM. 
The assets of the estate herein are substantial and the 
desires of testator in paying of amounts due with interest 
thereon can be carried out without harming the estate. 
Again using statutory definitions, Section 74-3-15, U. 
C.A. 195a provides: "Legacies bear interest from the time 
when they are due ,and payable, except that legacies for 
maintenance, or to the testator's widow, bear interest from 
the testator's decease." This statute refers to previous sec-
tions 74-3-1 (classifying all legacies including annuities) 
and 74-3-14 (stating commencing and due dates for lega-
cies including annuities.) Annuities are due and payable 
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cornmencing with tes'tartor's decease and thered:ore bear in~ 
terest f,rom testator's death date or when subsequently fall~ 
ing due. Also in this instance the monthly payments are for 
maintenance and to the widow and hear interest from the 
testator's decease. 
Interest is a. part of or an accretion rto the legacy it-
self. In re Platt's Estate; In re Luckel's E-state, supra. 
Where hav·e a testamentary trust to pay income to 
successive beneficiaries, the fonner beneficia:ry is entirtled 
to income from date of death otf testator and interest at the 
legal rate thereon regardless wherther delay is due to fault 
of Executor or not and whether or not same person is Ex-
ecutor and Trustee. Restatement orf Trusts 2nd, Section 
234, oonunent e. 
Matter of Biro's Will, 241 NY 184, 149 NE 827, holds 
that interest is paya!ble on legacy otf income even where 
legatee delays settlement by instituting suit ~contesting the 
WilL A direction in the Will addressed to Trustee to pay 
income of trust to legatee does not exonerate Executor 
from paying income and interest thereon to the beneficiary. 
CONCLUSION 
That the Will of testator herein is clear and unambig-
uous ·showing an intent to provide annuities to re,spondents 
from date of death of testator and the respondents are en-
titled to interest thereon from date otf accrual thereof as 
provided m the Findings and Judgment of lower Court (R. 
460-472). 
That this Court should find t!hat the Trustee has no 
"sound discretion" to not make up such payments and has 
exceeded its authority and breached the trust favoring the 
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respondents pursuant to testator's Will. The great ma-
jority of the cases and law writers are against the position 
of appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN AND PAYNE, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont 
128 East Center Street, 
Provo, Utah. 
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